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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78A-4-103(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Appellee takes exception to Appellant's framing of his issues 1 and 3. 
Issue #1 as presented in Appellant's Brief states: "Whether the District Court 
abused its discretion in finding that petitioner's debts incurred solely by herself 
during the marriage, and without any knowledge, consent, input or control of the 
respondent should be shared by the respondent," is misconstrued. The District Court 
below did not make findings that would suggest these issue as presented by 
Appellant. The issue is better stated as follows: Whether the District Court 
correctly specified which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, 
obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during the marriage. 
Issue #3 as stated by Appellant is also not clear and misleading. It states: 
"Whether the Court abused its discretion by finding that Appellant commingled 
premarital financial accounts and cash gifts from his mother made during the 
marriage with another account in which Appellant deposited traceable income 
earned during the marriage and paid business operation expenses and personal living 
expenses; and whether Appellant premarital accounts lost their identity and 
character as separate property by temporarily depositing them into a joint account 
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with Appellee to protect them from seizure by his former spouse." The issue as 
framed suggests that the District Court made it's findings based upon a commingling 
of funds notion and therefore the accounts in question lost their identity as separate 
property. As will be discussed below, the District Court did not base itfs findings on 
a commingling theory but provided the basis of its findings only after a full, detailed 
and careful analysis of the unraveling of the accounts in question. The District 
Court was more specific and the issue is better stated as: Whether the District Court 
correctly determined that the Investment and Retirement Accounts were subject to 
division as marital property. 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES, 
AND REGULATIONS WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE 
There are no constitutional provisions, ordinances, or regulations that are 
determinative of this case. 
Statutes: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(1) (2010) provides, in relevant part: 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable 
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-3(1) and (2) (2008) provides: 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, Divorce, Chapter 4, Separate 
Maintenance, or Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, and in any 
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action to establish an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, or 
division of property in a domestic case, the court may order a party to pay the costs, 
attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party to 
enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action. The order may include 
provision for costs of the action. 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time, child support, alimony, 
or division of property in a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney 
fees upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the claim or 
defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a 
party if the court finds the party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for 
not awarding fees. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-11(4) (2010) provides: 
(4) The right to the use of water evidenced by shares of stock in a corporation shall 
not be deemed appurtenant to land. 
Rules: 
Utah Rule Of Civil Procedure Rule 26. 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may 
be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
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(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered b\ the court, this 
disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to 
provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party 
regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report 
prepared and signed by the witness or party. The report shall contain the subject 
matter on which the expert is expected to testify; the substance of the facts and 
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify; a summary of the grounds for 
each opinion; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications 
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid 
for the study and testimony; and a listing ot any other cases in which the witness has 
testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
(a)(3)(c) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, the 
disclosures required by subdivision (a)(3) shall be made within 30 days after the 
expiration of fact discovery as provided by subdivision (d) or, if the evidence is 
intended solely to contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified 
by another party under paragraph (3)(B), within 60 days after the disclosure made by 
the other party. 
UTAH RULES ()¥ EVIDENCE 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
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(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable 
dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources 
whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and 
supplied with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an opportunity 
to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter 
noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after judicial 
notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall instruct the jury to 
accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall 
instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept as conclusive any fact 
judicially noticed. 
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Rule 614. Calling and interrogation of witnesses In i oiirl 
(a) Calling by court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a 
party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus 
called. 
(b) Interrogation by court. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by 
itself or by a party. 
( c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation 
by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is 
not present. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final order entered on July 15, 2010 arising from a 
two-day bench trial in a divorce proceeding before Judge Robert K. Hilder, Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County. The findings of fact issued by the ( uiirt on July 2, 
2010 was reduced to a final divorce decree that was entered on July 15, 2010. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Both parties are 73 years old, having met in high school but not marrying until 
later in life (R. 20). Each party has two previous marriages and lived with each 
other since 1999 (R. 21; Findings, 1). Appellant divorced from his second wife in 
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January 2002 and the parties married May 20, 2002 (Findings, 2). The parties 
separated January 15, 2008 and the marriage lasted 5 years and 8 months (Findings, 
6). 
During the proceeding the District Court Judge reviewed and took judicial 
notice of a 42 page Davis County docket of Appellant's prior divorce with his 
second wife (Findings, 8; R. 299-304, 346, 347, 350,351). The court did so after 
hearing testimony of his previous marriage and his attempt to shield his assets. 
There was never an objection made by Appellant over this Judicial Notice or the 
questioning that followed by the District Court Judge. Based upon testimony given 
by the parties the court found that Appellant had actively taken steps to protect his 
financial interests in his previous marriage and the current marriage of the parties 
that went well beyond legitimacy. According to the District Court, it was clear from 
the Davis County Docket and Appellant's own testimony that he was willing to 
undertake acts that included deception to shield assets (Findings, 9; R. 300, 346, 
347). Appellant claimed he had to protect his assets due to a difficult second 
marriage and that that was evidence that he had to do so in the present marriage as 
well. The court disagreed and indicated that Appellant understood other options 
such as a pre- or post-marital agreement but no such written agreement was provided 
(Findings, 10;R. 350). 
The court found that Appellant maintained his own funds in the name of his 
elderly mother, Lorena Liston, at Barnes Bank and that none of those funds 
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belonged to his mother (R. 299-303). These fictitious accounts were the primary 
accounts that Appellant used during the course of the present marriage with 
Appellee to obscure and shield his financial dealings and to avoid judgment 
collection (R. 346-347). Appellant routinely deposited earnings from consulting as 
an engineer into this account, said deposits being marital earnings (Findings, 11; R. 
348, 349, 422). 
During the course of the marriage the parties used separate accounts, but the 
court found that the fact that they may have had separate accounts does not mean 
that the parties finances were not combined in substantial ways. For example, both 
had separate credit cards but both cards were used to purchase the entire range of 
marital goods and expenses (Findings, 12; R. 117-120, 183, Petitioner's Ex. 54, 55). 
Further, the court found that the Appellee left the marriage with $30,500 of debt and 
that the debt related to family expenses that was unpaid at the time of separation. 
The two credit cards in question total approximately $30,500.00 (Petitioner's Ex. 54, 
55). There was no evidence to suggest that the debt was for the sole benefit of 
Appellee (Findings, 13). The court found that the Appellant did not identify debts to 
be allocated but that the Appellee did support her claim of $30,500 of marital debt 
and that these debts were not for her exclusive benefit nor were they used without 
marital benefit. Moreover, Appellee did not have the income to support many of 
these expenditures (Finding, pp. 11; R. 117-120,183,293,294; Petitioner's Ex 54). 
The court further found that many of the day-to-day expenses, including food, 
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entertainment, use of and gas for the car, Christmas for the families, and travel 
where substantially paid by Appellee and therefore the court found that $30,500 of 
debt was marital and should be shared equally between the parties (Findings, p. 12; 
R. 117-120, 183, Petitioner's Ex. 54, 55). 
The court found that the parties had obtained a marital residence and that 
residence was the subject of a mediation agreement between the parties, Appellee 
having giving up her equity for payment of $10,000 ®. 65; Petitioner's Ex 16). 
During the course of the marriage the parties also subdivided their real property and 
sold off a portion of the property to maximize its value (Findings pp 8-10). The real 
property also included shares in Holliday Water Company, one of the shares the 
court found to be appurtenant to the property. Subsequent to the subdividing of the 
property, 4 water shares from Holliday Water Company existed and related to the 
real property. Based upon the testimony of the manager of Holliday Water 
Company, which the court found to be persuasive, the court found that only one of 
the 4 shares was appurtenant to the property, that share having been tied to a single 
meter on the property which is necessary for the property to receive culinary water 
(Findings, pp. 10; R. 68, 70, 73, 239, 243, 244, 246, 247; Petitioner's Ex 17). The 
other 3 shares were valued at $5000 each (total value $15,000) and the court found 
that the real value was in order to obtain new service to a new meter and not to 
obtain additional water without charge (Findings pp. 10-11). The court further 
determined that these 3 shares were not the subject of the mediation agreement 
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between the parties for the satisfaction of Appellees interest in the real property and 
that Appellant could either pay Appellee $7500 or could transfer her 1 share and pay 
her $2500 (Findings, pp. 11; R. 68). 
The Appellant accumulated and held money over the years and the course of 
the marriage with Fidelity Investments. Appellant was gainfully employed during 
the marriage but was rather reluctant to say that the monies in Fidelity Accounts 
came from income while working ( R. 51-52, 348,349,357,383,422). He provided 
no evidence as to the source of those funds (R. 357, 383 422,425, 427,428,431). 
The money found in Barnes Bank which showed numerous transactions had nothing 
to do with his mother Lorena Liston but were a fiction created by Appellant to avoid 
judgment collection ( R. 427-431). The Barnes account shrunk because the majority 
of the money went to Fidelity (R. 431). The Appellant failed to bring evidence such 
as taxes to show his income or gifts from his mother as he claimed ®. 446). During 
the marriage accounts were closed, funds transferred, and combined causing the 
court to have to "unravel" what is separate and marital property in this divorce 
(Findings, p. 14). 
The court was aided by an expert, Rebecca Schreyer, CPA, and also used it's 
own analysis (R. 202-235). The court concluded that the CPA letter of December 
18,2009, provided the best starting point (Findings, p. 14; Petitioner's Ex 28). This 
letter was prepared after she reviewed the voluminous financial statements from 
Fidelity (R. 207). 
10 
The court agreed with the expert's analysis that the IRA rollover account 
ending in account number 3460 was Appellant's premarital property and his sole 
property (Findings, pp. 14-15; R. 208; Petitioner's Ex. 30). The court also agreed 
with the with the expert CPA that the amounts found in account ending in numbers 
5706 and having a balance of $72,065.66, were also premarital property but were 
added to during the marriage (R. 209; Petitioner's Ex 31). The court stated that 
there could have been an argument as to this particular account 5706 and the amount 
therein could be considered marital, since subsequent activity could be seen as 
converting it to marital property, but Appellee did not urge this strongly and the 
court prudently fore bore from this equitable approach (Findings, p. 15). 
Starting in on October 30, 2002, however, marital funds were added during 
the marriage to this 5706 account (Findings, p. 15). Appellant claimed the additions 
came from his mother but offered no evidence of this statement (R. 338-341, 343, 
344-345). Appellant further stated he was not sure of the source of funds (R. 357). 
Appellant stated he transferred accounts as a diversionary tactic to protect his money 
(R. 345). The court stated that even if it believed the money might have been a 
separate gift, subsequent actions involving this account, combined with the lack of 
evidence regarding the source of the funds, persuaded the court that the all of these 
amounts should be treated as marital funds (Findings, p. 15). With the additions, the 
account grew to $161, 984.31 and that amount was transferred to another account in 
it's entirety to an account ending with number 3162 which was in Appellees sole 
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name (Findings, p. 16; R. 210), This transfer occurred in June 1, 2004, and about 6 
months later the money in account 3162 was again transferred to an account ending 
in numbers 7442, which the Appellant opened in his mothers name (R. 212; 
Petitioner's Ex 35). The court found it was not Appellant's mother's money as 
Appellant had claimed, but instead another device to protect his accounts either from 
his second wife or the Appellee (Findings 16). 
The court further focused on this account ending in numbers 7442 (Findings, 
p. 16). The amount transferred in January 2005 from account 3162, which was in 
Appellee's sole, name to Lorena Liston's sole name account 7442 was $169,415.85 
(Findings, p. 16). Account 7442 was opened in November 2004 with a $30,000 
deposit, the deposit from a Lorena Liston account that the court had found was held 
solely by Appellant and was not for Lorena (R. 338-341). No evidence was shown 
to the contrary by Appellant (R. 343). This account was used by Appellant to 
channel all of his income and expenses, including marital earning, which were 
substantial during this period of time (Findings, pp. 16-17). From the Lorena Liston 
account which reached $397,334.89, all monies were again transferred into Sergay 
Liston's sole account ( R. 217). The court did not have any doubt that the $30,000 
that funded the Lorena Liston account initially, and subsequent account deposits in 
the total of $95,000 were comprised of marital money (Findings, p. 17). The only 
difference that the court had with the expert CPA was an apparent omission of 
$5,000 business account deposit. The court further noted that none of the accounts 
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discussed at this point were retirement accounts except the account previously 
determined to be separate property (Findings, p. 17; R. 210-217). 
The CPA testified that a great deal of money came into the Fidelity Accounts 
subsequent to the sale of the marital property subdivision in 2005. For example, in 
April 2005 prior to the close of the marital property subdivision the Barnes Bank 
Account was just $4,000. In May 2005, after the close of the property the account 
grew to $160,964.48 due to the sale of the subdivision (R. 431; Ex 27, 40). She 
recognized these as proceeds from the sale. There was also over $345,000 placed 
into Barnes Bank in just 10 bank statements alone ( R. 428). They had nothing to do 
with his mother Lorena (R. 429). At one point during the marriage the accounts 
grew to $613,577.93 (R. 222). 
The court then came to another difference with the expert CPA. The expert 
CPA identified an account ending in numbers 2680 as a retirement account opened 
on April 1, 2002, with a balance of $123,215.12. The CPA looked at a deposit in 
November 2006 and a transfer to an account 5584 in December 2007 and assumed 
that the entire marital portion of the IRA account 2680 was transferred into account 
5584. The CPA then identified a balance of $24,924.97 which was transferred in 
March 2008 to account 5385 which was the last account that appears to have held 
funds based upon evidence presented at trial (Findings, p. 17). After hearing all the 
evidence provided by the parties the court found that the funds held in the account 
ending in 2680 and the transactions discussed by the expert CPA did not in fact 
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constitute either receipt or transfer of marital funds. The account was determined to 
be the sole account of Appellant and the $24,924.97 transfer into account 5584 his 
sole property (Findings, p. 18). 
Based upon the court's analysis, the court adjusted the CPA calculation found 
on page 2 of her expert letter (See Petitioner's Ex 28), by deducting $19,924.97 from 
the balance in account 5585. The sum was reached by the court by subtracting 
$24,924.97 and adding $5000 from the business check deposit during the course of 
the marriage and discussed above that was not in the expert CPA's calculations 
(Findings, p. 18). One more adjustment was made. The court deducted $97,027 
premarital value resulting in a marital interest at the time of separation in the amount 
of $273,563 but the court further reduced the amount by $513. The reason for the 
final deduction is that the CPA analysis included growth in the fund. The court 
applied a percentage of the total that included growth and determined the difference 
between the growth on the account determined by the expert CPA ($293,558) and 
the amount determined by the court ($273,050). 
Many deposits were made into the Fidelity accounts after the sale of the 
marital subdivision that was partitioned off from the marital home (R. 160, 211,214, 
431). 
Based upon it's thorough and careful analysis, the court determined that 
Appellee's portion of the financial accounts was $136,525 (Findings p. 18). 
14 
The court found as to attorney fees, that based upon the awards set forth in it's 
Ruling and Order that it did not find that either party had an inability to pay fees 
incurred. The court did find however that based upon the issue of fault, primarily 
Appellant's ongoing and blatant attempts to hide assets, confuse financial 
transactions, and otherwise be accountable for his court ordered and marital 
obligations, an award of fees was appropriate. The point of the award in the court's 
view was that Appellant had made the case much more difficult than it should have 
been (R. 159, 164; Findings 23).The amount given was conservative given the 
complexity of the case that should have been much more simple. The court found 
that $5,000 to be given to Appellants attorney was fair and equitable considering the 
many hours of extra work that went into bringing this matter to conclusion 
(Findings, 23). 
From the Findings and Order counsel for Appellee prepared a Decree of 
Divorce. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court correctly and equitably specified which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties that were 
contracted or incurred during the marriage. The evidence was presented and the trial 
judge should be given great deference in the findings of fact and should not be 
overturned as they are not clearly erroneous. 
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The District Court also ruled correctly and was within its discretion when it 
equitably awarded the additional water shares between the parties and its decision 
should be upheld. 
The District Court correctly determined which investments and retirement 
accounts were marital property and divided them equitably between the parties. The 
trial court should be given considerable discretion concerning this property division 
and the court's actions enjoy a presumption of validity and are not erroneous. 
The District Court handled itself appropriately throughout the trial and with 
the upmost courtesy when it interrogated Appellant after taking judicial notice of a 
prior divorce action in Davis County. The Appellant should be held responsible for 
his actions. 
Lastly, the District Court correctly awarded Appellee's Attorney fees based on 
the issue of fault of Appellant's ongoing and blatant attempt to hide assets, confuse 
financial transactions, and otherwise avoid being accountable for his court ordered 
marital obligations. The Appellant made this case much more difficult than it should 
have been. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT L THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY SPECIFIED WHICH 
PARTY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF JOINT DEBTS. 
OBLIGATIONS. OR LIABILITIES OF THE PARTIES CONTRACTED OR 
INCURRED DURING THE MARRIAGE. 
Appellate courts give great deference to the trial court's findings of fact in 
divorce cases and will not overturn them unless they are clearly erroneous. See, 
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Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, If 14, 217 P.3d 733; Thompson v. Thompson, 
2009 UT App 101, f 10, 208 P.3d 539; Leppert v. L^pperf, 2009 UT App 10, If 8, 
200 P.3d 223; Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, f 9, 176 P.3d 476; 
Kelley v. Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, f 18, 9 P.3d 171. A finding of fact will be 
adjudged clearly erroneous if it violates the standards set by the appellate court; is 
against the clear weight of the evidence; or the reviewing court is left with a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, although there is evidence to 
support the finding. See, Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, ^  14; Shinkoskey v. 
Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 44, f 10 n.5, 19 P.3d 1005; Kelley, 2000 UT App 236, f 
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In divorce proceedings, the trial court is given considerable discretion in 
fashioning an equitable property distribution, and its findings will not be disturbed 
absent an abuse of discretion." Carlton v. Carlton,! 56 P.2d 86, 87 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). In that case the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
The trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its failure to do 
so constitutes reversible error unless the facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment. In addition, the findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist 
of enough subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court took to reach its 
conclusion on each factual issue presented. 
Id. at 87-88. 
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Here, the District Court's division of debt determination explains a clear 
factual basis and analysis supporting its determinations on the marital debt and 
provides this appellate court with enough information to allow meaningful review. 
Appellee presented evidence regarding the balances on her credit cards. (R. 
178; Ex. 54, 55.) During the course of the marriage the parties used separate 
accounts, but the court found that the fact that they may have had separate accounts 
did not mean that the parties finances were not combined in substantial ways. For 
example, both had separate credit cards but both cards were used to purchase the 
entire range of marital goods and expenses (Findings, 12; R. 117-120, 183, 
Petitioner's Ex. 54, 55). Further, the court found that the Appellee left the marriage 
with $30,500 of debt and that the debt related to family expenses that was unpaid at 
the time of separation. The two credit cards in question total approximately 
$30,500.00 (Petitioner's Ex. 54, 55). There was no evidence to suggest that the debt 
was for the sole benefit of Appellee (Findings, 13). The court stated that 
"[petitioner did not have the income to support many of the expenses she was called 
upon to pay during the marriage. It is true that petitioner terminated full-time work, 
and cut back substantially on her part-time working activities, but at the time of the 
marriage each of the parties was 65 years old." (Findings, 11). The trial judge is in 
the best position to make this decision and his broad powers of discretion should be 
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supported. It would be unfair to the parties and the judge if a review of each 
transaction that occurred in the marriage had to be individually reviewed. 
Appellee testified she incurred credit card debt to pay for meals out together, 
groceries, things for the house, use and gas for the car, clothing, and two trips to see 
her dying father and his funeral. (R. 118-119, 183) She also testified she paid for all 
the parties' food. (R. 280). The court found that "[d]uring the marriage, petitioner 
paid for many day-to-day expenses, including food, entertainment, Christmas for 
families, and travel." (Findings, 11.) Appellee testified that both she and Appellant 
received benefits through these credit charges. (R. 118-19.) Appellee testified that 
between $30,000 and $35,000 of her current debt was incurred during the marriage. 
( R. 281-83.) The court found that Appellee had established debts of at least 
$30,500, which debts constituted "a marital obligation, to be shared equally." 
(Findings, 12.) 
To suggest, as the Appellant is suggesting, that he was in a "powerless and 
ignorant position" and should therefore not be held jointly liable for debts incurred 
during a marriage by a spouse who was "concealing" the use of their individual 
credit account makes absolutely no sense unless you are either trying to delay or 
avoid payment of a debt or unaware of where the food you are eating came from. 
Did he not eat the food as she paid for it at the restaurant? He is not an "innocent 
bystander" as he suggests. He was her husband and if he had any evidence of this 
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victimization as he suggests, he should have brought the evidence to trial. He did 
not. 
As a review of the record reveals there was no contrary evidence to rebut 
Appellee's testimony put forth by Appellant. The trial court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY AND WAS WITHIN 
ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT EQUITABLY AWARDED THE ADDITIONAL 
WATER SHARES TO THE PARTIES, 
The court found that the parties had obtained a residence during the marriage 
and that residence was the subject of a mediation agreement between the parties, 
Appellee having giving up her equity for payment of $10,000 ®. 65; Petitioner's Ex 
16). During the course of the marriage, the parties also subdivided the real property 
that the marital home was situated on and sold off a portion of the property to 
maximize its value (Findings pp 8-10). The real property also included 4 shares in 
Holliday Water Company, one of which shares the court found to be appurtenant to 
the property. Based upon the testimony of the manager of Holliday Water Company, 
Marlin K. Sundberg, which the court found to be persuasive, the court found that 
only one of the 4 shares was appurtenant to the property, that share having been tied 
to a single meter on the property which is necessary for the property to receive 
culinary water (Findings, pp. 10; R. 68, 70, 73, 239, 243, 244, 246, 247; Petitioner's 
Ex 17). Mr. Marlin Sundberg of the Holliday Water Company testified that the 
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company sells water shares for $59000.00 each. (R. 247.) The court found that the 
real value was in order to obtain new service to a new meter and not to obtain 
additional water without charge (Findings pp. 10-11). Marlin Sundberg testified that 
the other shares could be sold. (R. 70, 242-43.) One share "is tied to the single 
meter on the property . . . and is absolutely necessary to permit the property owner to 
receive culinary water from the Holliday Water Company" (Findings, 10). 
The court further determined that these 3 shares were not the subject of the 
mediation agreement between the parties for the satisfaction of Appellees interest in 
the real property and that Appellant could either pay Appellee $7500 or could 
transfer her 1 share and pay her $2500 (Findings, pp. 11; R. 68). 
Mr. Sundberg's testimony and the Judge's Findings are supported by Utah 
law. In Utah Code Annotated Section 73-1-11 (4) it reads in pertinent part: 
(4) The right to the use of water evidenced by shares of stock in a corporation shall 
not be deemed appurtenant to land. 
Mr. Sundberg testified that only one water share was appurtenant to the land 
and needed to remain with the meter. The other shares were freely transferable. 
While it is true that under Utah law, a stipulation reached by divorcing 
spouses regarding property division should be recognized and enforced by the courts 
(Sweet v. Sweet, 2006 UT App 30 216, 3, 138 P.3d 63 (slip op.) (noting that spouses 
have general authority "to arrange property rights by contract.") (quoting Reese v. 
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Reese, 1999 UT 75, 24, 984 P.2d 987)), what Appellee was transferring was the real 
property and the 1 appurtenant share of water, not the other shares that were freely 
transferable under Utah law and according Mr. Sundberg. 
The court was within its discretion to divide the other 3 shares of water as it 
did. 
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED WHICH 
INVESTMENT AND RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS WERE SUBJECT TO 
MARITAL PROPERTY. 
A trial court has considerable discretion concerning property [division] in a 
divorce proceeding, thus its actions enjoy a presumption of validity" Jensen v. 
Jensen, 2009 UT App 1, t6 ,203 P.3d 1020 (quoting Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT App 
83, f 17, 45 P.3d 176). On appeal, we therefore " will not disturb a property award 
unless we determine that there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderates 
against the findings, or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear 
abuse of discretion." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Further," 
[w]e review the legal adequacy of findings of fact for correctness as a question of 
law."M 
Stated another way, when reviewing a district court's findings of fact on 
appeal, we do not undertake an independent assessment of the evidence presented 
during the course of trial and reach our own separate findings with respect to that 
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evidence. Rather, we endeavor only to evaluate whether the court's findings are so 
lacking in support that they are against the clear weight of the evidence. 438 Main 
St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f 75, 99 P.3d 801. 
In this case, the trial court's findings are not so lacking in support as to be 
clearly erroneous. Indeed, the Appellee was forced to go on an unnecessary and 
expensive discovery journey to just get to the bottom of Appellant's finances which 
were more complicated and voluminous than reasonably necessary. In a bench trial 
or other proceeding in which the judge serves as fact finder, the court has 
considerable discretion to assign relative weight to the evidence before it. This 
discretion includes the right to minimize or even disregard certain evidence. State v. 
Comer, 2002 UT App 219,115, 51 P.3d 55. There is ample evidence supporting 
this finding of the trial court that Appellee's portion of these marital accounts was 
$136,525 (Findings p. 18). For instance, The Appellant accumulated and held money 
prior to and during the course of the marriage with Fidelity Investments and Barnes 
Bank. Appellant was gainfully employed during the marriage but was rather 
reluctant to say that the monies in Fidelity Accounts came from income while 
working (R. 51-52, 348, 349, 357, 383,422). He was employed by Conestoga Cold 
Storage as late as late 2007 although he had testified earlier it was 2005 (R. 425). 
The trial court also specifically found that Appellant had taken steps to hide 
accounts from his former and current wife (R. 344, 345, 427-431). He provided 
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no evidence as to the source of those funds ( R. 357, 383 422,425, 427,428,431). 
The money found in Barnes Bank which showed numerous transactions had nothing 
to do with his mother Lorena Liston but were a fiction created by Appellant to avoid 
judgment collection (R. 427-431). Further, the Barnes account shrunk because the 
majority of the money went to Fidelity ( R. 431). The Appellant failed to bring 
evidence such as taxes to show his income or gifts from his mother that he claimed ( 
R. 446). During the marriage accounts were closed, funds transferred, and 
combined causing the court to have to "unravel" what is separate and marital 
property in this divorce (Findings, p. 14). 
Due to the complicated financial structure of the Appellant's accounts, the 
court was aided by an expert, Rebecca Schreyer, CPA, and also used it's own 
analysis (R. 202-235). The court concluded that the CPA letter of December 18, 
2009, provided the best starting point (Findings, p. 14; Petitioner's Ex 28). This 
letter was prepared after she reviewed the voluminous financial statements from 
Fidelity ( R. 207). The CPA was retained pursuant to a Court Order that was signed 
November 23, 2009, and entered November 30, 2009. That Order resulted from a 
Stipulation entered by the parties (See Attached, November 30, 2009 Order). To the 
knowledge of Appellant and a thorough review of the Record there was never an 
objection to the CPA, nor to her Report. Further, to now suggest that it is a violation 
of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3), is not true either. She was Stipulated to by 
the parties and Court Ordered which is an exception to Rule 26 that is now being 
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announced by Appellant (See Addendum, Court Order of November 30, 2009 
attached). Further, the Report was delivered to Appellant's counsel and he even 
corresponded with the expert ( Ex. 28, 29). It is also a stretch, as Appellant has 
suggested, that she claimed she was not an expert (See Appellant's Brief, p. 35). 
What the record states is that she did not consider herself an "expert at being an 
expert witness" (R. 236). It was an attempt by the witness to be self-deprecating. 
The Court felt she enunciated the rules of marital distribution well (R. 237). In any 
event, what is true, Appellant agreed to admit the Report and Appellant never 
objected to that Report or her being an expert witness (R. 131, 227). 
In many instances, the court agreed with Appellant. The court agreed with the 
expert's analysis that the IRA rollover account ending in account number 3460 was 
Appellant's premarital property and his sole property (Findings, pp. 14-15; R. 208; 
Petitioner's Ex. 30). The court also agreed with the CPA that the amounts found in 
the account ending in numbers 5706 and having a balance of $72,065.66, was also 
premarital property but was added to during the marriage (R. 209; Petitioner's Ex 
31-53). The court stated that there was an argument as to this 5706 account that it 
was marital since subsequent activity could be seen as converting it to marital 
property, but that Appellee did not urge this strongly and the court prudently fore 
bore from using this equitable approach (Findings, p. 15). The Appellant's 
argument seems to be stuck on this point, and goes on into detail about commingling 
of accounts, but this is not the basis for the court's findings. 
25 
In October 30, 2002, marital funds were added to the account 5706 (Findings, 
p. 15; R., 210). Ten thousand dollars in 2002, $63,000.00 in July 2003, $4500.00 in 
March of 2004. The account grew during the marriage to $163,219.18 (R. 210). In 
account ending 7442, the Lorena K. Liston account, deposits were made of $115,000 
(R. 214). Appellant claimed the additions came from his mother but offered no 
evidence of this statement (R. 338-341,343,344-345). He continues this theory in 
his current brief. But as was found in court, Appellant stated he was not sure of the 
source of funds (R. 357). At one point, the Appellant claimed none of his earnings 
went into the accounts (R. 348). But once pushed on the subject he admitted he did 
put money in those accounts during the marriage (R. 349). Most unusual was his 
admission in court that he transferred accounts as a diversionary tactic to protect his 
money( R. 345). 
With additions, the 5706 account grew to $161,984.31 and that amount was 
transferred to another account in it's entirety to an account ending with number 3162 
which was in Appellees sole name (Findings, p. 16; R. 210), This transfer occurred 
in June 1, 2004, and about 6 months later the money in account 3162 was again 
transferred to an account ending in numbers 7442, which the Appellant opened in 
his mothers name (R. 212; Petitioner's Ex 35). The court found it was not 
Appellant's mother's money as Appellant had claimed, but instead another device to 
protect his accounts either from his second wife or the Appellee. The court further 
focused on this account ending in numbers 7442 (Findings, p. 16). The amount 
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transferred in January 2005 from account 3162 which was in Appellee's sole name to 
Lorena Listonfs sole name account 7442 was $169,415.85 (Findings, p. 16). Account 
7442 was opened in November 2004 with a $30,000 deposit from a Lorena Liston 
account that the court had found was held by solely by Appellant and was not for 
Lorena ( R. 338-341). No evidence was shown to the contrary by Appellant (R. 
343). This account was an account that Appellant channeled all of his income and 
expenses, including marital earnings, which were substantial during this period of 
time (Findings, pp. 16-17). From the Lorena Liston account which reached 
$397,334.89, all monies were again transferred into Sergay Listonfs sole account ®. 
217). The court did not have any doubt that the $30,000 that funded the Lorena 
Liston account initially, and subsequent account deposits in the total of $95,000 
comprised of marital money (Findings, p. 17). The only difference that the court had 
with the expert CPA was an apparent omission of $5,000 business account deposit. 
The court further noted that none of the accounts discussed at this point were 
retirement accounts except the account previously determined to be separate 
property (Findings, p. 17; 210-217). 
The CPA testified that a great deal of money came into the Fidelity accounts 
subsequent to the sale of the marital property subdivision in 2005. In April of 2005, 
prior to the close of the marital property subdivision the Barnes Bank Account was 
just $4,000. In May 2005, after the close of the property the account grew to 
$160,964.48 due to the sale of the subdivision (R. 431; Ex 27, 40). She testified 
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that she "recognized that there were proceeds from the sale of the property that 
would have funded a lot of the deposits that were made into this account that I've 
allocated to deposits made during the marriage/' ( R. 225). 
There were over $345,000 placed into Barnes Bank during the marriage in 
just 10 bank statements alone (R. 428). They had nothing to do with his mother 
Lorena (R. 429). At one point, the actual value of the fidelity accounts totaled 
$613,577.93, the marital portion being less ( R. 222) 
In April of 2005, the Barnes Bank balance was $4,000.00. But upon the sale 
of the subdivision property in May 2005 that balance jumped to $160,964.48 due to 
the sale of the subdivision (R. 431; Ex. 27, 40) The balance dropped significantly 
shortly after because the money went in the Fidelity Accounts and Appellant admits 
this (R. 431). 
The court then came to another difference with the expert CPA. The expert 
CPA identified an account ending in numbers 2680 as a retirement account opened 
on April 1, 2002 with a balance of $123,215.12. The CPA looked at a deposit in 
November 2006 and a transfer to an account 5584 in December 2007 and assumed 
that the entire marital portion of the IRA account 2680 was transferred into account 
5584. The CPA then identified a balance of $24,924.97 which was transferred in 
March 2008 to account 5385 which was the last account that appears to have held 
funds based upon evidence presented at trial (Findings, p. 17). After hearing all the 
evidence provided by the parties the court found that the funds held in the account 
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ending in 2680 and the transactions discussed by the expert CPA did not in fact 
constitute either receipt or transfer of marital funds. The account was determined to 
be the sole account of Appellant and the $24,924.97 transfer into account 5584 his 
sole property (Findings, p. 18; R. 217). 
To suggest as Appellant does that Appellee does not have a marital portion in 
these accounts flies in the face of reason. While on one hand, the Appellant 
concedes that earnings during the marriage in his Mountain Lion Engineering 
business was marital property, he forgets to mention that the greatest source of funds 
accumulated in Fidelity were from the sale of the marital subdivisions that was 
partitioned off from the marital home (R. 160, 211,214, 431). Those amounts went 
into Fidelity. Those amounts were identified and were marital. They bought the 
property together when married and worked on the subdivision together during the 
marriage. Appellant wants it all and does not share well, plain and simple. Perhaps 
he should have had a pre- or post-marital agreement which he was familiar with (R. 
349). 
Based upon the court's analysis, the court adjusted the CPA calculation found 
on page 2 of her expert letter (See Petitioner's Ex 28), by deducting $19,924.97 from 
the balance in account 5585. The sum was reached by the court by subtracting 
$24,924.97 and adding $5000 from the business check deposit during the course of 
the marriage and discussed above that was not in the expert CPAfs calculations 
(Findings, p. 18). One more adjustment was made. The court deducted $97,027 
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premarital value resulting in a marital interest at the time of separation in the amount 
of $273,563 but the court further reduced the amount by $513. The reason for the 
final deduction is that the CPA analysis included growth in the fund. The court 
applied a percentage of the total that included growth and determined the difference 
between the growth on the account determined by the expert CPA ($293,558) and 
the amount determined by the court (273,050). Finally, based upon it's thorough 
and careful analysis, the court determined that Appellee's portion of the financial 
accounts was $136,525 (Findings p. 18). 
Appellant's commingling diatribe misses the point that the court made in its 
findings. The court's analysis is much more than a discussion on commingling. It is 
an extensive, time consuming and accurate Findings. To further suggest that there 
was no evidence to identify the source of funds that were deposited during the 
marriage, other than Appellant's own testimony, and that they were gifts from his 
mother and in making numerous transactions of the same funds (which were 
admittedly appreciating over time) into different accounts to protect them from 
garnishment by his former wife, and that Appellee did not meet her burden of proof, 
make little sense. Appellant was employed and they bought and sold property that 
they worked on together during the marriage. If his elderly mother gave him money 
as he claimed, he clearly never showed any proof of it to the court. 
With these facts in mind, as well as the deferential standard of review, see, 
e.g., Leppert v. Leppert, 2009 UT App 10, f 9, 200 P.3d 223 (mWe afford the trial 
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court considerable latitude in adjusting financial and property interests, and its 
actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.m (quoting Davis v. Davis, 2003 UT 
App 282, <h 7, 76 P.3d 716)); Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, f 44, 
176 P.3d 476 ("We defer to the trial court in its findings of fact related to property 
valuation and distribution."), we cannot say that the trial court's fair, thorough and 
reasonable findings are clearly erroneous and it must be upheld. 
POINT IV, THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY INTERROGATED 
THE APPELLANT AFTER TALKING JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE 
APPELLANTS PRIOR DIVORCE ACTION IN DAVIS COUNTY. 
The trial court asserted "judicial notice" as its basis for independently 
obtaining the court docket in Appellant's prior divorce case in the Second District 
Court for Davis, County and referring to it while questioning the Appellant while he 
was on the witness stand. (See Utah R. Evid. 201 (stating the rule for judicial 
notice)). While it is true that neither counsel for the parties had provided this 
information to the court beforehand, nor was counsel for either party given any 
advance notice by the court that it was conducting its own discovery into Appellant's 
prior divorce action and would refer to it, it is also true that there was absolutely no 
request or objection to the court to be heard by Appellant under Rule 201. The Rule 
states in pertinent part(s): 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
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tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request 
may be made after judicial notice has been taken... 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
Ironically, the court was tipped off by Appellant's own testimony of avoiding 
judgments in Davis County (R. 299-301) and became puzzled by his answers (R. 
301). The judge very astutely went online with the court's computer and pulled the 
docket from Davis County while Appellant's testimony continued. The judge did 
not ask about the Davis Court Docket action until approximately a half an hour later 
at which time he questioned Appellant about his previous divorce and statements 
(R. 346, 347). Appellant, as opposed to what his brief says, was afforded the 
opportunity to look at the Docket (R. 347). Further, no objection was made. 
Rule 614 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 614. Calling and interrogation of witnesses by court 
(a) Calling by court. The court may, on its own motion or at the suggestion of a 
party, call witnesses, and all parties are entitled to cross-examine witnesses thus 
called. 
(b) Interrogation by court. The court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by 
itself or by a party. 
( c) Objections. Objections to the calling of witnesses by the court or to interrogation 
by it may be made at the time or at the next available opportunity when the jury is 
not present. 
Appellant argues that the trial judge abandoned its role as an impartial 
adjudicator by questioning him. Because Appellant did not object to the court's 
questioning, he must demonstrate plain error on appeal. See State v. Kell, 2002 UT 
32 
106,^ [ 45, 61 P.3d 1019 ("Because defendant did not object to the comments during 
the trial, we review this issue for plain error."); see also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) (stating to establish plain error a defendant must show: "(I) 
[a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful"). 
Under rule 614(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, "[t]he court may interrogate 
witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party." In this case, the trial court 
questioned Appellant about the Davis County divorce where he was also hiding 
funds from a former wife's judgment (Findings p. 16; R346, 347). 
The court questioned Appellant to help clarify perhaps whether Appellant's 
earlier testimony was credible or showed a pattern of deceit. "It is within the judge's 
prerogative to 'ask whatever questions of witnesses as in his judgment is necessary 
or desirable to clarify, explain or add to the evidence as it relates to the disputed 
issues/ " State v. Boyatt, 854 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah Ct.App.1993) (quoting State v. 
Mellen, 583 P.2d 46, 48 (Utah 1978)). 
Further, even if it was error for the trial court to solicit testimony from 
Appellant, the error was harmless. "If the error was harmless, that is, if the error 
was sufficiently inconsequential that there is no reasonable likelihood that it affected 
the outcome of the case, then a reversal is not in order.1" Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. 
Harrison, 2003 UT 14,1 22, 70 P.3d 35 . In this case, the trial court's questioning of 
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Appellant (without a jury) is "sufficiently inconsequential," id., and does not warrant 
reversal. It is true that the judge mentions this testimony from the colloquy in its 
findings, but it is not plain error. From the Findings it is clear that the court relied 
on numerous grounds for its decision including credibility determination about 
Appellant. Indeed, the court weighed all the evidence and noted Appellant's pattern 
and method of hiding money. Moreover, Appellant's use of a 1989 7th Circuit 
opinion that relates to judicial notice should not be seen by this court as controlling. 
Because evidence for the court's credibility determination was ample in many 
areas and the court did not rely solely on the disputed portion of Appellant's 
testimony, Appellant's plain error argument fails. 
POINT V, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AWARDED APPELLEE 
ATTORNEY FEES. 
The trial court's division of debts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See 
Connellv. Cornell, 2010 UT App 139, f 8, 233 P.3d 836. Similarly, an appellate 
court will "review a trial court's decision regarding attorney fees in a divorce 
proceeding for an abuse of discretion." Id. f 6. 
The court found that "based on the issues of fault, primarily respondent's 
ongoing and blatant attempt to hide assets, confuse financial transactions, and 
otherwise avoid being accountable for his court ordered marital obligations, an 
award of fees is appropriate. The point of the award is that in the Court's view, 
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respondent has made this case much more difficult than it should have been." 
(Findings, 23) 
The court found "that it is completely fair and equitable that respondent be 
required to pay the sum of $5,000 to petitioner's attorney as partial compensation for 
the many hours of work and effort that have gone into bringing this matter to 
conclusion." (Findings, 23; R. 159, 164), 
As opposed to what Appellant is stating, the court found that he did have 
resources to pay an award and judgment of attorney fees (Findings 23). 
Appellant relies upon Utah Code section 30-3-3 which generally governs 
awards of attorney fees in domestic actions. In provides that a trial court may order 
a party to pay costs, attorney fees, and witness fees, including expert feed, of the 
other party. See, e.g., Rhen v. Rhen, 1999 UT App 41, f 22, 974 P.2d 306 (M[A]n 
award [of attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code section 30-3-3] must be based on 
sufficient findings addressing the financial need of the recipient spouse; the ability 
of the other spouse to pay; and the reasonableness of the fees."). 
Here, the record indicates that the district court did not award attorney fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 30-3-3, but rather because Appellant's fault, 
primarily Appellant's ongoing and blatant attempt to hide assets, confuse financial 
transactions, and otherwise avoid being accountable for his court ordered marital 
obligations, an award of fees is appropriate. The point of the award is that in the 
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Court's view, a very patient court, is that Appellant made this case much more 
difficult than it should have been. Such awards fall within the district court's 
inherent powers and do not implicate Utah Code section 30-3-3. See generally 
Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, ff 12-14, 985 P.2d 255 (upholding the trial court's 
monetary sanction for waste of judicial resources as an exercise of the court's 
inherent powers); Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993) 
(ff[C]ourts of general jurisdiction . . . possess certain inherent power to impose 
monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their conduct thwart the court's scheduling 
and movement of cases through the court."). Appellant raises no argument on appeal 
that the district court exceeded its inherent powers when it awarded attorney fees 
and therefore fails to address the actual basis of the district court's ruling. Under 
these circumstances, the appeals court should not disturb the district court's attorney 
fees award. Cf. State v. Hurt, 2010 UT App 33, f 16, 227 P.3d 271 (affirming denial 
of a suppression motion where appellant failed to acknowledge or address the legal 
basis for the district court's ruling). 
Instead of basing an award of attorney fees on the factors enumerated in 
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 10, as Appellant relies, the court imposes fees based 
upon "fault" of the Appellant. The court was imposing fees, at least in part, because 
of Appellant's shifting funds between accounts to protect assets. Moreover, 
Appellant does not take court orders seriously. Even during the pendency of the 
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district court proceeding he withdrew money and purchased a home with his new 
girlfriend in Davis County even though he had been court ordered not to withdraw 
more than $10,000.00 (Findings p. 13 ). 
Appellee requests attorney fees on appeal. "Generally, when fees in a divorce 
case are awarded to the prevailing party at the trial court, and that party in turn 
prevails on appeal, then fees will also be awarded on appeal." Marshall v. Marshall, 
915 P.2d 508, 517 (Utah Ct.App.1996). 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly and equitably specified which party is responsible 
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties that were 
contracted or incurred during the marriage. The evidence was presented and the trial 
judge should be given great deference in the findings of fact. The decision should 
be upheld. 
The District Court also ruled correctly and was within its discretion when it 
equitably awarded the additional water shares between the parties and its decision 
should be upheld. 
The District Court correctly determined which investments and retirement 
accounts were marital property and divided them equitably between the parties. The 
trial court should be given considerable discretion concerning this property division 
and its actions enjoy a presumption of validity and are not erroneous. 
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The District Court handled itself appropriately throughout the trial and with 
the upmost courtesy when it interrogated Appellant after taking judicial notice of a 
prior divorce action in Davis County. The Appellant should be held responsible for 
his actions. 
Lastly, the District Court correctly awarded Appellee's Attorney fees based on 
the issue of fault of Appellant's ongoing and blatant attempt to hide assets, confuse 
financial transactions, and otherwise avoid being accountable for his court ordered 
marital obligations. The Appellant made this case much more difficult than it should 
have been. 
Appellee asks this Court to uphold the determinations of the District Court, as 
set forth above. Further, Appellee requests attorney fees on appeal 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ( day of April, 2011. 
Todd D. Gardner 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this / - day of April 2011,1 caused to be HAND 
DELIVERED, two (2) true and correct copies including one (1) pdf, read only CD 
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following: 
Clark Ward 
6925 Union Park Center, #600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
Todd 
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ADDENDUM 
Findings of Fact, issued July 2,2010; 
Decree of Divorce entered July 15, 2010. 
Copy of November 30,2009 Order 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRfc^i^^*IW?<', COUR 
inird Judicial District 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH JUL 0 2 2010 
\K*7 SALT LAKE COUNTY 
ByiSL 
Deputy Clc 
ANNETTE LISTON, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
Petitioner, RULING AND ORDER 
vs. 
SERGAY LISTON, 
Respondent. 
CASE NO. 084900427 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This divorce action was tried to the Court on June 24 and 25, 2010. 
Todd D. Gardner appeared for petitioner and Clark R. Ward appeared for 
respondent. Following the testimony of the parties and additional 
witnesses, and closing argument, the Court took the matter under 
advisement. Having now fully considered all of the evidence and 
applicable law, the Court enters the following Findings of Fact, and 
specific Rulings on each of the issues presented by the parties. The 
Findings and the Rulings are intended to provide a sufficient factual and 
legal basis for a Decree of Divorce to be prepared by counsel for 
petitioner, but if either counsel believes additional Findings are 
necessary, they may be included as long as they are supported by the 
record and consistent with this Ruling and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 The parties to this action are both 73 years of age. They 
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originally met during the 9th grade of high school, but they did not marry 
until May 20, 2002, after each of the parties had been married and 
divorced on two prior occasions. Before the parties were married, they 
lived together commencing approximately 1999, at which time petitioner was 
divorced from her second husband, and respondent was still married, but 
in the process of obtaining a divorce. 
2 Respondent's divorce Decree was entered in January, 2002, and 
the parties were married the following May. 
3 The parties announced an engagement on New Year's Eve, 1999, 
at which time respondent presented petitioner with a wedding/engagement 
ring. It is disputed whether the ring presented at that time included a 
substantial diamond at its center. It is not disputed that the ring as 
it now exists does not include a primary diamond, but that it now consists 
of small diamond pieces surrounding a cubic zirconium. The Court cannot 
determine whether there was ever a large diamond in the ring, but the 
Court does find that respondent either deliberately misled petitioner at 
the time of engagement and for several years thereafter into believing 
that he had bought her a genuine diamond, or alternatively, respondent had 
an original diamond replaced by cubic zirconium sometime after the 
marriage. 
4 The Court cannot determine the value of the ring, with or 
without a diamond. The insurance renewal for the ring, which was dated 
in 2001, more than a year after the ring was purchased, showed a maximum 
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insurance value of $14,000. Respondent recalls that he paid about $475, 
which included his wedding band. 
5 The parties disagree on whether the marriage was ever a happy 
one. It is agreed that they separated on or about January, 2008. There 
is some dispute over the precise date, but the Court finds that a date of 
approximately January 15, 2008, is close to the reality, and sufficient 
for the Court's need to establish a date when the marriage effectively 
ended. 
6 As discussed with counsel at the close of trial, and pursuant' 
to the Court's discretion to determine a date for division of property, 
debts, and financial assets, the Court will use the January 15, 2008 
separation date, rather than the date of trial. Using this date, the 
Court finds that the parties were engaged in a bona fide marriage for 
approximately five years and eight months. The Court specifically finds 
that the parties lived separate lives, both physically and in the 
management of their finances, from the date of separation. 
7 As stated above, the parties disagree as to the essential 
happiness of their relationship. The Court finds that petitioner's belief 
that the parties were generally happy in their marital association is 
correct, but it is also true that their happiness was marred by 
disagreements regarding inappropriate activities conducted by respondent, 
which the Court finds did occur, but which the Court also finds do not 
need to be examined in any further detail. The parties engaged in marital 
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counseling at various times during the marriage, including in the first 
year or so, but the fact of this counseling and the concerns that prompted 
the parties to go to counseling, do not play any significant part in the 
Court's determination of the issues presented at trial. 
8 The Court has reviewed, and taken judicial notice of, the 42 
page docket reflecting the course of the divorce case between respondent 
and his second wife, which matter was handled in Davis County. The Court 
is also aware that petitioner has been divorced on two prior occasions, 
but the Court does not have substantial or detailed information regarding 
the cause of those divorces. 
9 Based on both the court docket and the testimony of the 
parties, primarily respondent's own testimony, the Court finds that 
respondent has very actively taken steps to protect his financial 
interests, both with respect to the second divorce, and during this 
marriage, which is not of itself improper, but the Court finds that 
respondent has gone well beyond measures to protect what is legitimately 
his. It is clear from the docket and respondent's own testimony, that he 
was willing to undertake any acts, including substantial deception, to 
shield assets that should have been available to satisfy claims of his 
former wife, which claims were vindicated by Court Judgments. 
10 Respondent claims that his difficult second divorce and his 
necessary efforts to protect his assets are evidence that he took 
appropriate steps to preserve all separate property in the present 
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marriage. The Court disagrees. Despite respondent's prior experiences 
regarding marital and separate assets, and whatever his desires, the Court 
finds that in many respects he was ineffective in separating and shielding 
assets from the reach of petitioner. For example, respondent alluded to 
an "agreement" between the parties to this marriage regarding separate 
finances, but no such agreement was written, and neither was any such 
agreement conceded by petitioner. This is so despite the fact that 
respondent had a property agreement in his second marriage, which 
agreement apparently was invalidated by the Court. Nevertheless, the Court 
finds that respondent understood the option of preparing either a pre- or 
post-nuptial agreement to protected or segregate assets, and did not do 
so. 
11 The Court finds that as part of his effort to protect or hide 
assets from the reach of his former spouse, respondent maintained the 
majority of his liquid funds in a* Barnes Bank checking account in the name 
of his mother, Lorena Liston. The respondent candidly admitted that none 
of those funds actually belonged to his mother, although some of them may 
have been received initially as gifts from his mother. Nevertheless, the 
Lorena Liston account, which was a fiction invented to obscure and shield 
respondent's financial dealings, was in fact respondent's primary account 
during much of the parties' relationship. Among other deposits into that 
account, respondent routinely deposited earnings from his freelance work 
as a consultant/engineer. These deposits represented marital earnings, 
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which were deposited into an account controlled solely by respondent, 
12 During the marriage, the parties did keep separate financial 
accounts, but the Court finds that the fact that the accounts were in one 
or the other sole name does not mean that the parties' finances were not 
combined in substantial ways. For example, both parties had individual 
credit cards, which cards were used for the entire range of expenses and 
purchases, including items purchased for the individual, and items 
purchased for the benefit of the household. As a general rule, items 
purchased generally throughout the course of a marriage, particularly 
including food, clothing, utilities, and all of the usual expenses of day-
to-day living, are considered marital expenses, not subject to scrutiny 
or allocation after the parties divorce or separate. 
13 In this case, the evidence is persuasive that petitioner 
incurred debt related to family expenses in the amount of at least 
$30,500, which debt was unpaid at the time of separation. Except for a 
disputed item regarding purchase of a motor vehicle, there is no evidence 
to suggest that any purchases on the account at issue were for 
petitioner's individual benefit or that those purchases resulted in 
acquisition of individual property that should be addressed in an ultimate 
personal property allocation by this Court. 
14 The transaction raised by respondent relates to an undisputed 
purchase of a motor vehicle for about $10,000, which amount was charged 
to a credit card while it was bearing zero interest. Petitioner testifies 
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that the debt was paid off before the parties separated, and it is not 
part of the $30,500 debt balance she took at the time of separation. 
Respondent claims that by check number 282 from the Lorena Liston account, 
in the amount of $10,900, he in fact paid off that debt. The Court has 
examined the check at issue carefully, and agrees with petitioner that the 
memo entry, in respondent's handwriting, refers to a home or house 
purchase payment. The Court believes the first word is '"house," 
petitioner believes that word is %%home," but regardless of the precise 
word, there is no suggestion on the check that it related to a vehicle 
purchase or debt payment. Furthermore, even if respondent used funds to 
pay off a debt on his wife's credit card, more than two years before the 
parties separated, which sum is not a part of the $30,500 debt that 
petitioner seeks to divide between the parties, there is no basis for the 
Court to second guess the motive for that payment during the marriage. 
15 The Court finds that the vehicle that was paid off during the 
marriage was traded in on a new vehicle for petitioner, at the insistence 
of petitioner's daughter, who the Court finds paid the remainder of the 
cost of the new vehicle. 
16 The new vehicle in question is a 2005 Subaru, which is 
petitioner's present vehicle. Respondent claims an interest in this 
vehicle, as marital property. Apart from the fact that respondent asserts 
what this Court deems to be an inflated present value for the Subaru, the 
Court finds that the evidence is clear that except for the $3,400 down-
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payment, which came from marital funds, the vehicle was a gift to 
petitioner, which gift was never converted to marital property. 
Having determined the foregoing facts, the Court now turns to its 
rulings on each of the specific issues submitted to it, which rulings will 
include by necessity additional specific findings: 
Grounds and Jurisdiction 
The Court finds from the evidence that the parties were both 
residents of Salt Lake County at least 90 days before the filing of this 
matter, although respondent is now a resident in Davis County. Therefore, 
the Court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter. It 
is apparent from the evidence that the parties have suffered 
irreconcilable differences, such that the marriage cannot be preserved, 
and they should be awarded a divorce on grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
Petitioner's surname 
Petitioner has asked to be restored to the use of her prior surname; 
to wit: Lindsay. She should be permitted to change her name to Lindsay 
upon execution of the Decree of Divorce in this matter. 
Real Property 
The parties initially lived in a mobile home (to be addressed in the 
personal property section below) but within a few months of marriage, they 
moved into a house on approximately one acre of land located at 1835 
Gunderson Lane in Salt Lake County. There was argument at trial about 
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whether the property was in fact marital, but that issue has been almost 
entirely resolved by a mediation agreement that both parties submitted to 
the Court to resolve the real property issue, except for the disputed 
issue of water shares. Nevertheless, the Court is concerned that there 
may be lingering doubts about whether the property was in fact marital. 
In the event that is the case, the Court now states its findings and 
conclusions that both parties contributed to the down payment on the 
house. The amounts may have been similar, if a loan from respondent's 
mother is excluded, but regardless, they each contributed at least $8,000, 
and the fact that petitioner's contribution was in the form of foregoing 
her real estate commission is of no consequence, because that was money 
to which she was fully entitled. In addition, mortgages were paid by 
respondent, but out of an account from which he paid numerous household 
expenses, and which account received money that could only be considered 
marital property. Both parties worked to maximize the value of the 
property and accomplish a subdivision, which they did successfully. All 
of these factors make it clear to the Court that the property was marital. 
The foregoing determination is apparently consistent with the 
parties' conduct in negotiating a settlement of any interest petitioner 
may have in the property at the time of mediation. The agreement that was 
received by stipulation makes it clear that petitioner should receive 
$10,000 upon execution of a Quit-Claim Deed. There is a dispute whether 
or when that Deed was executed. Regardless, that is an act that still 
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needs to occur. The Court finds that the $10,000 was consideration for 
petitioner giving up all interest in the real property on Gunderson Lane. 
The real property included shares in Holliday Water Company, one of which 
shares the Court finds was, in fact, appurtenant to the property. 
Subsequent to the subdivision, and at the time of the mediation agreement, 
there were four shares in Holliday Water Company which are related to the 
real property. Based on the testimony of the Holliday Water Company 
Manager, which the Court found to be persuasive, the Court finds that only 
one of the four shares is in fact appurtenant to the property. More 
specifically, this share is tied to the single meter on the property 
titled in the parties' names, and is absolutely necessary to permit the 
property owner to receive culinary water from Holliday Water Company. 
The remaining three shares are undisputedly valued at $5,000 each. 
Those shares represent three of the total 7,200 shares issued by the Water 
Company. The value of those shares is that installation of a meter in any 
of the areas served by Holliday Water Company must be tied to a single 
share of stock for service to be provided. Accordingly, there is a market 
for individual shares as property owners add water service. The other 
value of the shares is that for each share held, the owner is entitled to 
60,000 gallons of free water each year, perhaps twenty percent of the 
modest requirements of one family. At current rates, that benefit is 
worth about $63 per year, and the Court finds, consistent with the 
testimony of the Manager, that the real value of a share is in the ability 
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to obtain a new service to a new meter, and not the ability to obtain an 
additional 60,000 gallons of water per year,, without charge. 
The Court determines that the three non-appurtenant water shares 
were not covered by the mediation agreement for satisfaction of 
petitioner's interest in the real property. Those shares are marital 
property, with a total value of $15,000. Respondent shall be ordered to 
pay to petitioner the total sum of $7,500 for her half interest in the 
shares, or he may alternatively transfer one share to petitioner, and pay 
$2,500 to equalize the division. Petitioner is ordered to execute a Quit-
Claim Deed as soon as possible in exchange for the yet to be tendered 
payment of $10,000 as provided by the mediation agreement. 
Marital debts 
The Court does not see where respondent identified any marital debts 
for allocation. Petitioner has established debts of at least $30,500, 
which sum the Court finds to be supported sufficiently by the evidence. 
The Court finds that there is no evidence supporting any argument that 
petitioner incurred the $30,500 for her exclusive benefit, or that the 
parties did not benefit through the course of the marriage from her 
expenditures. Petitioner did not have the income to support many of the 
expenses she was called upon to pay in the marriage. It is true that 
petitioner terminated full-time work, and cut back substantially on her 
part-time working activities, but at the time of the marriage each of the 
parties was 65 years old. There was no agreement or requirement that 
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petitioner would continue to work, and until the parties' marriage, while 
they were living together, respondent paid virtually all of their 
expenses. 
During the marriage, petitioner paid for many day-to-day expenses, 
including food, entertainment, Christmas for families, and travel. The 
Court is not determining that she paid all of these expenses, but she made 
substantial payments towards these items. For the foregoing reasons, the 
Court finds that the $30,500 in debt as of the date of separation in 
January, 2008, is a marital obligation, to be shared equally. Respondent 
shall be ordered to pay $15,250 to petitioner to satisfy his share of the 
marital debt. The Court finds that the debt is in fact outstanding for 
one or more credit cards, none of which bear respondent's name, and he 
should have no liability therefor. Nevertheless, in the event there 
should be any claim made against respondent by a creditor for said debt, 
petitioner shall be ordered to indemnify and hold him harmless therefrom 
after respondent pays his $15,250 allocation. 
Petitioner's Motion for Protective Order and Motion for Order to 
Show Cause Regarding Use of Assets 
There are two proceedings that occurred during the pendency of 
this action that give rise to opposing claims for attorney fee 
reimbursement. In June, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for a 
Protective Order, in which she alleged she was in fear of respondent, 
specifically based on what she perceived as a threat contained in a 
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letter respondent wrote to her attorney approximately one week prior. 
The Petition was unsuccessful, but this Court determined, as stated 
during trial, that as to the core issue of fear, and the existence of 
an implied threat by respondent, implying the potential use of force, 
including using deadly force, the allegations were not manifestly 
untrue. This Court does not second guess the determination of the 
Court that denied the Protective Order, but neither can this Court find 
that there is any basis for an award of attorney's fees based solely on 
the fact that the Order was dismissed. 
On the other hand, the parties were clearly engaged in efforts to 
protect assets during the pendency of the action. Respondent was 
ordered to not use more than $10,000 each month from the various 
investment accounts he controlled, but in August, 2009, respondent 
withdrew about $195,000 to purchase his present home. It is true that 
respondent gave notice of this intention, through his counsel, but 
respondent's notice was mere lip service. That is, he gave notice to 
his counsel, counsel acted promptly to convey the notice and a request 
for an exception to the Order to petitioner's counsel, imposing a very 
short deadline, but respondent went ahead and completed the transaction 
without waiting for that date to pass. 
Respondent's main response to criticism of his actions is that he 
had a good faith belief that the money was his. In fact, he almost 
certainly did have a right to the sum he withdrew, and more, at the 
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appropriate time, but such belief, right or wrong, does not justify 
respondent in ignoring a Court Order. There is no request for a 
finding of contempt, and none will be made, but the Court does find 
that respondent should reimburse petitioner the amount of $500 as a 
reasonable amount for attorney's fees incurred in relation to this 
matter. Such award shall be in addition to any other attorney's fee 
award that may be granted herein. 
Investment and Retirement Accounts 
Respondent has accumulated various monies over the years, 
including before this marriage, which are held in a series of Fidelity 
Investment accounts. During the marriage some accounts have been 
closed, some funds have been transferred, and others have been 
combined, resulting in the necessity for the Court to unravel separate 
and marital property for division as part of this divorce action. 
The Court was greatly aided in this task by the analysis and 
testimony of Rebecca Schreyer, CPA, but the Court also applied its own 
legal analysis and application of the facts to modify the recommended 
allocation provided by Ms. Schreyer. The Court concludes that Ms. 
Schreyer's initial analysis, set forth in her letter of December 18, 
2009 (petitioner's Exhibit 28) provides the best starting point. 
First, the Court agrees with the ultimate determination that 
respondent's rollover IRA account ending in the numbers 3460 was 
respondent's premarital property, with no additions or reductions 
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during the period of May 2, 2002 through January 15, 2008, which dates 
the Court finds to be appropriate for analysis. Accordingly, any 
amounts in that account are respondent's sole property. 
The Court also agrees that account number ending in the digits 
5706, and the balance of $72,065.66 at the time of marriage, were 
premarital property. There is a tenable argument that subsequent 
activity in this account could convert the entire account to marital 
property, but petitioner does not urge that position strongly, and the 
Court agrees that her forbearance from so doing is consistent with an 
equitable approach to this account, starting on October 30, 2002, 
however, funds were added to that account in the total of $77,559.89 
all of which funds were added during the marriage. Respondent claims 
that some or all of those funds came from his mother, as a gift. There 
is one exception, a check for $4,500 dated March 23, 2004, which came 
from respondent's business account. Such sum is clearly marital 
property. 
With respect to the other sums that respondent claims came from 
his mother, he proffers no documentary evidence or other evidence that 
would support his claim. Even if the Court was inclined to believe 
those sums might have come as a separate gift, subsequent actions 
involving this account, combined with the lack of evidence recording 
the source of the funds, persuade the Court that all of these amounts 
should be treated as marital funds. With these additions, the account 
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grew to $161,984.31, and the entire amount was transferred to an 
account ending in the number 3162, which account was in petitioner's 
sole name. 
Respondent admits that he made that transfer, and claims without 
any apparent understanding of the irony of the situation, that he did 
so to protect the money from garnishment for sums due to his second 
wife, pursuant to judgments in Davis County. That transfer occurred on 
June 1, 2004, and about six months later the money in account ending 
3162 was transferred to account ending 7442, which respondent opened, 
this time in his mother's name. The Court does not believe that 
respondent claims that the money was in fact his mother's, but even if 
he made such a claim, it is clear to the Court that the use of his 
mother's name on this Fidelity account (7442) was simply another device 
to protect money, either from his second wife, or from petitioner. 
This series of transactions leads the Court to further analysis focused 
on the funds in account ending 7442. 
The amount transferred from account 3162 in petitioner's name, to 
7442, in Lorena Liston's name, was $169,415.85. The transfer occurred 
in January, 2005. Account 7442 was opened in November 2004 with a 
$30,000 deposit, check number 208, from the Lorena Liston account, 
maintained solely by respondent, for his benefit. Respondent claims 
that these were not marital funds, but the Court has already determined 
that this was the account in which respondent channeled all of his day-
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to-day income and expenses, including his marital earnings, which were 
substantial during this time period. The Court does not have any doubt 
that the $30,000 that funded the account initially, and subsequent 
deposits in the total amount of $95,000 ($90,000 from the personal 
account in the name of Lorena Liston, from May 2005 through March 2006, 
and $5,000 from respondent's business account, which funneled business 
earnings, on May 2, 2005) comprise marital property. Accordingly, the 
only difference the Court has with Ms. Schreyer on her accounting of 
deposits to account 7442 from 29 November, 2004 through 15 March, 2006, 
is that she apparently omitted the $5,000 business account deposit. 
The Court notes at this point that none of the accounts discussed 
thus far include retirement funds, except for the account that has been 
determined to be separate property. 
The Court's analysis now comes to another difference with Ms. 
Schreyer. Ms. Schreyer identifies account number ending 2680 as a 
retirement account, which opened on April 1, 2002 with a balance of 
$123,215.12. She looks at a deposit in November of 2006, and a 
transfer to account 5584, in December 2007, and assumes that the entire 
marital portion of the IRA account 2680 was transferred into account 
5584. Ms. Schreyer then identifies a balance of $24,924.97, which was 
transferred in March, 2008, to account ending 5385, which is the last 
account that appears to have held the funds, based on the evidence 
available at trial. 
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After hearing the evidence of all of the parties, the Court 
determines that the funds held in account 2680, and the transactions 
discussed by Ms. Schreyer, do not in fact constitute either receipt or 
transfer of marital funds. This account is determined to be entirely 
the property of respondent, and the transfer of $24,924.97 into account 
5584, is determined to be separate property owned by respondent. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court adjusts the calculation 
on page 2 of Ms. Schreyer's letter (petitioner's Exhibit 28), by 
deducting $19,924.97 from the balance in account 5385 as shown on the 
Exhibit. This sum is reached by subtracting $24,924.97, and adding the 
$5,000 from the business check deposit during the term of the marriage 
that was not included by Ms. Schreyer. One more adjustment needs to be 
made. The Court deducts the $97,027 premarital value, resulting in a 
marital interest at the time of separation in the amount of $273,563, 
but the Court further reduces that sum by $513, to $273,050. The 
reason for this final deduction is that Ms. Schreyer's analysis 
included growth in the fund. The Court applied the percentage of the 
total that represented growth, and determined the difference between 
the growth on the amount determined by Ms. Schreyer ($293,558) and the 
amount determined by the Court ($273,050). 
Based on all of the foregoing, the Court determines that 
petitioner shall be awarded as her marital interest in investment 
accounts the total sum of $136,525. The Court notes that based on the 
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records presented at trial, this sum is available and held in non-
retirement funds, and the Court finds no basis to determine that 
petitioner does in fact have any interest in designated retirement 
funds, which funds to the extent they still exist should be awarded in 
their entirety to respondent. 
Personal Property 
The personal property issues present some difficulties, but more 
based on the emotional component issues than the numbers or 
characterization of property. Both parties feel that they have been 
treated unfairly by the other, and that certain property awards should 
be made in the interest of fairness, and to validate each party's 
subjective belief regarding that fairness. The Court will do its best 
to address those issues in turn, and briefly: 
(a) Mobile home. The first item is the mobile home in 
which petitioner is living, as well as a second mobile home she owns. 
Both of those mobile homes are premarital property; there is a credible 
claim that petitioner holds one of homes in constructive trust for her 
brother; and the value is likely less than respondent asserts, and not 
substantial. Because the Court finds that respondent has no interest in 
the properties, they are awarded to petitioner, with no final 
determination of value. 
(b) Hollidav Water Shares. These shares have already been 
addressed in connection with real property, and shall be allocated as 
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set forth herein. 
(c) Violins. The Court is persuaded that respondent has 
spent substantial sums purchasing violins during the marriage, but the 
unrebutted testimony is that he did so from funds received through 
selling or trading other property that was indisputably premarital. 
Respondent shall retain all violins with no compensation to petitioner. 
(d) Engagement/wedding ring. Petitioner is awarded the 
wedding ring in its present condition, without any credit to 
respondent. The ring was a gift. The Court must find that the 
petitioner has not met her burden of showing that there was a diamond 
in the ring when it was given to her, although it is admitted that 
there is no diamond in the ring now. Even if petitioner did in fact 
meet her burden of showing it was a diamond, she has failed in her 
burden to establish the value of the ring, including a diamond. 
Regardless of what the ring once was, it was a gift to petitioner, it 
is in her possession, and she may retain it without any credit to 
respondent. 
(e) 2005 Subaru Legacy Outback. This vehicle-is 
petitioner's sole property, except for the contribution of the down 
payment of the marital vehicle. That sum was $3,400. This Court is 
unaware of any principle that would require it to award a share in the 
full amount of the down payment, because the value of the traded 
vehicle and the new vehicle both depreciated before separation, but the 
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Court finds it equitable that respondent should receive $1,000 as 
compensation for the trade-in from the vehicle purchased during the 
marriage from marital funds. 
(f) Premarital property owned bv respondent. The Court 
finds that a number of items, including all of the older vehicles, are 
respondent's sole property. They include the 1963 Chevrolet pickup, 
the 1942 Pord, and other older vehicles and engines, etc., that were 
listed at trial, whether they are in their current form, or whether 
that asset has been sold and replaced with other assets. Unless 
specifically stated herein, petitioner has no interest in any such 
assets. 
(g) Miscellaneous property« Each of the parties shall be 
awarded the general furniture, televisions and other such items in 
their possession. These items do not have substantial value, they are 
no longer necessary for day-to-day living, and no value should be 
ascribed. The Court is concerned about the cavalier disregard shown by 
respondent in the lack of care taken for certain furniture items owned 
by petitioner, but petitioner also took too long in following through 
to pick up those items. Based on the values at issue, the amount of 
funds already divided herein, and because the only basis to award 
compensation to petitioner for these items would be essentially 
punitive, which the Court is unwilling to resort to on these issues, 
the parties will simply be awarded furniture and other items in their 
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possession, with no financial value ascribed. The Court, in fact, 
believes that the parties have come out very even in terms of the 
distribution of the relatively nominal personal property that was 
marital. 
Alimony 
Alimony is a difficult issue in this case in some ways. Neither 
party, both of whom are now retired, has sufficient income, excluding 
any potential investment income, to support the lifestyle they enjoyed 
during the marriage. Both, however, will have investment funds 
following the allocation decided herein, which will provide the ability 
to do two things: One, the parties, particularly petitioner, will have 
the ability to pay off all consumer debt, thus reducing her monthly 
expenses very substantially. Petitioner will also receive a 
contribution from respondent to pay of marital debt. Second, any sums 
remaining after debt reduction may be used to generate modest return. 
The Court may not invade the individual funds remaining after 
allocation of all property to provide alimony assistance except in 
extreme cases, and the Court cannot make any such determination in this 
case. This is particularly true in light of the age of both parties and 
the relatively short marriage. For these reasons, no alimony will be 
awarded. 
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Attorney's fees 
Based on the awards set forth above, the Court does not find that 
either party has an inability to pay fees incurred, but the Court finds 
that based on the issue of fault, primarily respondent's ongoing and 
blatant attempts to hide assets, confuse financial transactions, and 
otherwise avoid being accountable for his Court Ordered and marital 
obligations, an award of fees is appropriate. The point of the award 
is that in the Court's view, respondent has made this case much more 
difficult than it should have been. Both of the attorneys in this case 
are very able and they have acted with the utmost integrity and 
professionalism. Neither is asserting a claim for attorney's fees in 
any amount close to what could be justified given the complexity of 
what should have been a much more simple case. Nevertheless, the Court 
finds that it is completely fair and equitable that respondent be 
required to pay the sum of $5,000 to petitioner's attorney as partial 
compensation for the many hours of work and effort that have gone into 
bringing this matter to conclusion. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel for petitioner is directed to prepare a final Decree 
consistent with the Findings and Rulings set forth herein. This 
document may serve as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law for 
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that purpose. 
Dated this 2nd day of July, 2010. 
By the Court: 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
<7 duly 
foregoing Ruling and Order, to the following, this L~ day of
 />3*nfe, 
2010: 
Todd D. Gardner 
Attorney for Petitioner 
4120 S. Highland Drive, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Clark R. Ward 
Attorney for Respondent 
6925 Union Park Avenue, Suite 600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Todd D.Gardner (#5953) 
BATEMAN, GOODWIN & GARDNER 
4120 South Highland Drive, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801)424-3451 
Facsimile: (801)424-3429 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNETTE LISTON, DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, : 
vs. 
SERGAY LISTON, : Case No. 084900427 
Respondent. : Judge: Robert K. Hilder 
The above-entitled matter came before the court and was tried June 24 and June 25, 2010. 
Petitioner was represented by Todd D. Gardner and Respondent was represented by Clark R. Ward. The 
Court, having found and entered its Findings of Fact, Ruling and Order on July 2,2010, and that document 
being incorporated by reference as the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this matter and being 
otherwise fully advised, it is hereby 
ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 1 5 2010 
SALTL^CQyNTY 
Deputy Cleric 
1. Petitioner is awarded a Decree of Divorce upon the grounds of of irreconcilable differences to 
become final upon entry of this decree. 
2. Petitioner shall be returned to her former surname; to wit: Lindsay 
3. Respondent shall pay to Petitioner $15,250 to satisfy his share of the marital debt. In the event 
that there should be a claim made against Respondent by a creditor for said debt, Petitioner shall indemnify 
and hold harmless Respondent therefrom after Respondent pays his $15,250.00 allocation of marital debt. 
4. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired a home and real property located at 
1835 Gunderson Lane in Salt Lake County, Utah. That real property, pursuant to the Mediation Agreement 
the parties entered into December 2, 2009, shall be awarded to Respondent. Respondent shall pay to 
Petitioner $10,000.00 for her interest in the marital home upon Petitioner signing a quit claim deed 
conveying her interest in the property to Respondent. 
5. Respondent shall pay to petitioner the total of $7,500.00 for her half interest in the three non-
appurtenant water shares that the parties own with Holliday Water Company. Respondent may 
alternatively transfer one share to Petitioner and pay and additional $2,500.00 to Petitioner to equalize 
distribution. 
6. No alimony shall be awarded in this matter. 
7. Respondent shall reimburse Petitioner the amount of $500.00 as a reasonable amount of 
attorney's fees incurred by Petitioner having to enforce and Respondent violating the $10,000.00 per month 
investment withdrawal limits as ordered by the court during the pendency of this action. 
8. Petitioner shall be awarded as her marital interest from the parties investment accounts in the 
the total amount of $136,525.00. 
9. Petitioner shall be awarded the interest in her mobile home that she may have without any claim 
by Respondent. 
10. Respondent shall retain all violins without compensation to Petitioner. 
11. Petitioner shall be awarded her wedding ring in its present condition. 
12. Respondent shall receive from Petitioner $1,000.00 as compensation from the trade-in from the 
2005 Subaru Legacy Outback purchased during the marriage from marital funds. 
13. Petitioner shall have no interest in the 1963 Chevrolet Pick-Up, the 1942 Ford and other older 
vehicles and engines, etc. that were listed at trial. 
14. An additional award of $5,000.00 shall be paid by Respondent to Petitioner's attorney as 
additional compensation for attorney's fees. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this / • ? day of ,2010. 
Approved as to Form: 
BY THE COURT 
Robert K.'Hilder 
THIRD DISTRICT 
P } 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
^ This is to certify that on this _ day of h/->*-< 2010, that I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECIDE OF DIVORCE to the following: 
Clark R. Ward 
6925 Union Park Avenue, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Todd D Gardner 
Third Judicial DiWicV 
Todd D. Gardner (#5953) my A - ™flq 
BATEMAN. GOODWIN & GARDNER J "' cm 
4120 South Highland Drive, Suite 100 ^ SALT UKE COUNTY 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801)424-3451 
Facsimile: (801)424-3429 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Do;.. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANNETTE LISTON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SERGAY LISTON, 
Respondent 
ORDER 
Case No. 084900427 
Judge: Hikter 
Comm: Blomquist 
On October 30,2009, came before the court, Commissioner Michael Evans presiding on 
behalf of Commissioner Blomquist, Petitioner's Motion. Petitioner was present with her attorney 
Todd D. Gardner, and Respondent was present with his attorney Clark Ward. The parties met 
prior to the hearing and entered into a stipulation and placed it on the record before 
Commissioner Evans. The Court therefore, hereby makes me following Orders: 
1. The court orders ADR between the parties if it can occur on or before December 3,2009. 
Thereafter, the parties are excused from me ADR requirement. 
2. The marital home located on Gunderson Lane shall be appraised for valuation by a qualified 
appraiser agreed upon by the parties as soon as possible. The Petitioner shall pay for the 
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appraisal but the parties agree that the appraisal fee may be apportioned at a later hearing if 
the Petitioner decides that is necessary. 
3. The appraiser should be agreed upon and named by the parties no later than 14 days from 
the date of this Order or the parties shall come back before the court to submit names 
before the court and allow the court to decide who the appraiser will be. 
4. The named appraiser shall submit the appraisal report to the parties after he or she has 
determined an appraised value of the home. The parties will accept the determination of 
the appraised value as indicative of the value and agree not to oppose the determined value 
of the appraisal, except for good cause shown by the parties within 10 days of the appraisal 
report to the court and the parties. 
5. After the appraised value has been detennined, the parties shall either agree to purchase 
the home by paying the other party what their equity in the home would be according to 
the new appraisal. The equity, if any, should be determined on a 50/50 basis, after 
deducting traditional impounds, liens, mortgage loans, real estate fees, taxes, closing costs 
and the like. The purchasing party shall give notice to the other party of their intent to 
purchase out the other's equity in the marital home within 14 days of the appraisal report 
and shall close within 60 days from the date of the final appraisal report. Or, if both 
parties desire to purchase the marital home and cannot determine which party is to prevail 
in the purchase of the marital home, or if no party wishes to purchase the marital home, 
then the home shall be placed for sale with a qualified real estate agent and sold forthwith. 
6. The home, if not purchased by either party, shall be placed on the open real estate market 
with a qualified real estate agent that both parties agree upon. If the parties cannot decide 
on a qualified real estate agent then the parties shall hold another hearing to submit names 
before the court and allow die court to decide. The real estate agent named shall sell the 
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home at the appraised amount or higher or lower if it is the real estate agent's belief that 
the amount should be higher or lower due to the prevailing market conditions. The parties 
will accept the determination of the real estate agent's valuation and marketing skills as 
reasonable and agree not to oppose the determined value or marketing skills except for 
good cause as presented to the court. Upon sale of the marital home, the equity, if any, 
should be divided between the parties on a 50/50 basis, after deducting traditional 
impounds, liens, mortgage loans, real estate fees, taxes, closing costs and the like. 
Respondent is ordered to provide to Petitioner's counsel all of his current banking and 
financial statements including, but not limited to, Bank of America and Fidelity 
Investments within 14 days of this Order. These statements shall go back to at least July 
2009 to the present. 
Respondent is ordered to provide to Petitioner's counsel all of his agreement's, closing 
documents, and contracts regarding the purchase of his home in Davis County within 14 
days of this Order. 
Respondent is ordered to provide to Petitioner's counsel a copy of a recent appraisal he 
had done on the parties Gunderson Lane home. The appraisal is also due within 14 days of 
this Order. 
A qualified CPA shall be named by the parties to determine the fair market value the 
parties investments and banking accounts that are in either of their names, the names of 
third parties that are marital assets as determined by the CPA, including, but not limited to, 
Fidelity Accounts, Bank of America Accounts and accounts that are attributable to the 
marital estate. The Petitioner agrees to pay for the up-front fees of the CPA, but reserves 
the right to petition the court to apportion fees with Respondent if she determines that to 
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be necessary. The CPA shall be agreed upon and named by the parties no later than 14 
days from the date of this Order or the parties will hold another hearing to submit names 
before the court and allow the court to decide. 
11. The named CPA shall have at his or her disposal all statements, invoices, reports, 
printouts, or papers, necessary to make his or her determination of the value of the marital 
estate. The parties shall cooperate fully in this regard and supply the CPA with all 
requested information. 
12. The CPA shall submit a report to the parties after he or she has determined a value of the 
various investment and banking accounts. The parties agree to accept the determination of 
the value as indicative of the value and agree not to oppose the value determined by the 
CPA except for good and reasonable cause before the court 
13. The CPA shall determine the following: 1). The Value of all assets, banking and 
investment accounts held by each of the parties prior to their marriage 2). The value of all 
assets, investment/banking accounts held in die various accounts during the course of the 
marriage 3). The value of the account as of January 15, 2008 and 4) the value of the 
accounts as of the date of the report issued by the CPA. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ^b^ day of A/Q^ 2009. 
^ O F ^ ; X 
"Judge Robert K. Hilder 
Third District Court 
Recommended By: 
\^JUbU 
Commissioner Evans 
(On the bench for 
Commission Blomquist) 
raa*A^D#0i 
Approved as to Form: 
Clark Ward 
Dated: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER was served via first class U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, on the / day of November, 2009, to: 
Clark R Ward 
6925 Union Park Ave, #600 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Todd D. Gardner 
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